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MEDICIAL INTITIATIVES IN CONFLICT AND PEACEBUILDING 
 
Colin McInnes & Simon Rushton, Centre for Health and International Relations, Aberystwyth 
University 
 
This paper is a shortened version of a longer study commissioned by the Global Health and Foreign Policy 
Initiative at Johns Hopkins University and funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. It also builds upon 
research funded by the European Research Council’s Ideas programme (Grant Ref. 230489 GHG) and the UK 
Economic & Social Research Council’s New Security Challenges programme (Grant Ref. RES-223-25-0075). All 




Medical diplomacy must be made a significantly larger part of our foreign and defense 
policy, as we clean up from costly and deadly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. America has the 
best chance to win the war on terror and defeat the terrorists by enhancing our medical and 
humanitarian assistance to vulnerable countries. By delivering hope we will deliver 
freedom.1 
That health interventions offer a potential contribution to security has begun to attract interest from 
both the security and the health communities. According to such a view well-planned and targeted 
interventions can not only improve health outcomes but can also contribute to achieving wider 
political goals. In other words, health interventions need no longer be solely ‘for health’s sake’, but 
may at the same time serve a useful political purpose. The attraction of this idea has grown over 
recent years. Increasingly the West in general, and the US in particular, is facing complex 
emergencies where military intervention is not aimed solely at affecting political elites (whether that 
be bolstering or removing them) 2, but is also intended to achieve community-level objectives. These 
have included efforts to improve relationships between local communities and occupying forces 
(particularly important in an age of ‘asymmetric warfare’); attempts to increase people’s perception 
of the legitimacy of their government; and actions designed to promote peace and reconciliation 
between antagonistic communities within a state. US military dominance means that the really 
difficult battles are no longer traditional military ones. Far more challenging is the task of winning 
the hearts and minds of a people. Health interventions have increasingly been seen as having a part 
to play in delivering on these explicitly political objectives. 
 
But this basic logic can be operationalized in very different ways, and in pursuit of very different 
political ends. Former Director General of the WHO, Gro Harlem Brundtland talked of health being 
“a bridge to peace”, while former US Secretary of Health Tommy Thompson focuses in the above 
quote on “winning hearts and minds”, “Defeat*ing+ the terrorists” and, he argues later in the article, 
“win*ning+ the war on terror – at a relatively low cost”. Simply put, for Thompson health initiatives 
can help win the war, while for Brundtland they can help build the peace. Yet both rest upon the 
same logic: that health interventions can change people’s attitudes, and thus have desirable political 
effects. 
 
All of the types of health intervention which we discuss in this paper fall under the broad concept of 
‘health diplomacy’. As Feldbaum and Michaud argue ‘health diplomacy’ should not be conceived of 
solely in the narrow sense of “diplomatic negotiations for global health”, but should also incorporate 
the use of health programs to achieve what they term “ulterior foreign policy goals”.3 In other words 
health diplomacy is a two-way street: it involves both the use of foreign policy tools to support 
global health goals, and the use of health initiatives to support foreign policy goals.  
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It is the latter which is of primary interest here. We address both interventions designed to ‘win the 
war’ and  those intended to ‘build the peace’.  We begin by examining the manner in which medical 
aid has been used by the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan to highlight the distinction between 
two types of intervention – ‘tailgate medicine’ and ‘medical diplomacy’. The second part of the 
paper examines the manner in which health initiatives have been incorporated into peace processes 
and peace building. The paper concludes by highlighting a range of problems and dilemmas common 
to both ‘war-winning’ and ‘peace-building’ interventions. We argue that all health interventions are 
inherently political. What is different about the present situation is that this political element has 
been made more explicit and become a much clearer part of the rationale for how and why 
interventions are made. This new policy context poses challenges for all of the actors involved. The 
humanitarian aid community has legitimate concerns over the dangers of sacrificing its traditional 
reputation for neutrality and impartiality, but must nevertheless find a way to work effectively in the 
new landscape of health diplomacy. For the foreign and security policy communities the challenge is 
one of improving the extent to which it delivers on health: unless it does so the hoped-for political 
and military gains are unlikely to be a achieved. 
 
Military forces have a long history of providing medical aid to civilians, both in conflict and in other 
emergencies. Not least under the Geneva Conventions they have requirements to respect the sick 
and wounded, whilst occupying powers (such as the US initially in Iraq) have obligations to ensure 
adequate health care for the civilian population.4  In both Iraq and Afghanistan however US health 
assistance, and in particular military medicine, was used not only to improve health but as part of a 
wider political and military strategy. Of course there was nothing new in using health aid as part of a 
military campaign. In Vietnam for example MEDCAPS (variously Medical and Civic Action Projects or 
Medical Civil Assistance Programs) had been used as part of US counter-insurgency strategy.5 But 
two developments provided a new intellectual context for such operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
 
The first was the idea of ‘soft power’ - that states can achieve their political objectives not only by 
coercion and inducement but by attraction through ideas, values, cultural goods and institutions. 
That health could be a tool of soft power was explored in the early years of this decade by academics 
such as by Ilona Kickbusch,6 but the theory had already been put into practice by the US military 
prior to Iraq and Afghanistan.7 Health as soft power has become a highly controversial area 
however. The International Committee of the Red Cross’ Code of Conduct, for example, explicitly 
states that ‘We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy’.8 This 
reflects a long standing and influential perspective on medical ethics where the provision of health 
care should be based on need rather than affiliation to a particular political or ethnic grouping.  
However, as we discus later in this paper, the debate is a complex one characterized by a good deal 
of conceptual confusion and few easy answers. 
 
The second development was the movement away from a narrow perspective of operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan to ‘full spectrum operations’. Medical aid could play a role in such operations.  It is 
clear that the Department of Defense is investing significant amounts of time and money into 
providing development assistance (indeed the Pentagon now accounts for 20% of US ODA),9 and 
health interventions are a significant part of this strategy,10 while the use of military medics in full 




Historically, MEDCAPs have usually taken the form of tailgate medicine, and have indeed sometimes 
been synonymous with this. ‘Tailgate medicine’ is so called because it can literally be delivered from 
the back of a truck. Even when it is based in more formal surroundings such as local schools or small 
clinics, military medics often arrive in trucks and depart the same way rather than being based 
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within the local community. It is characterised by ad hoc initiatives, sometimes informal but 
sometimes authorised by local commanders, using spare medical capacity. Its focus is on primary 
care and acute medical conditions and is invariably short term in nature.  
 
Notwithstanding the medical benefits, the primary purpose of tailgate medicine is usually political 
and military.11 The key operational objective is to build popular support both for US forces and for 
the local government. Its target is public opinion and the means of influencing it is through 
demonstrably addressing a basic human need.12  This is not to say that humanitarian impulses are 
wholly absent, or that some individual ad hoc actions may not be wholly motivated by pressing 
humanitarian need; but as a policy, tailgate medicine is geared towards influencing hearts and 
minds rather than improving the health of the civilian population.13  
 
The problem with tailgate medicine however is that its medical deficiencies risk the very gains in 
public opinion which it is designed to  produce. These deficiencies include a short term focus on 
acute conditions and primary care, and the lack of follow-up. If secondary or tertiary care is 
needed, then there is no guarantee that referral systems will work or that local capacity exists for 
this. Diagnosis may be compromised by poor understanding of local customs, lack of knowledge 
of endemic conditions, possible difficulties in translation and a lack of testing equipment and 
facilities. Treatment may also be compromised by poor understanding of customs and practices – 
reports are common of drugs being misused in such circumstances. Perhaps even more 
problematic in the long-term is that tailgate medicine risks undermining confidence in local 
government agencies by replacing them or demonstrating their inadequacies, while treating one 
community may lead to resentment from a nearby rival community. The ad hoc nature of such 
operations also means that long term infrastructure projects involving inter-agency co-operation 
may not receive the attention they need, yet these are often the projects which are crucial for 
stabilising a region in the medium to long term. Moreover the primacy of the military mission may 
mean that resources are suddenly taken away leading to further resentment amongst the local 
population whose expectations had been raised. Finally, tailgate medicine may actually in some 
circumstances heighten insecurity by drawing large crowds – not always of those needing medical 
attention – which offer attractive targets to terrorists including suicide bombers, especially if such 
operations are advertised in advance.14  
 
Military medics face more difficulties. Their primary responsibility lies in supporting the medical 
needs of the military of which they are part, and if surplus capacity is available, then this might be 
used to promote the health of local civilians. But what happens if the conflict escalates and this 
spare capacity disappears to deal with military casualties? Expectations raised by the presence of 
military medics may be crushed, while those civilian patients requiring ongoing care and attention 
may find that this is no longer available. Moreover, despite the aspiration of an ‘exit strategy’, the 
end point for most military operations fluctuates. This means that the time military medics spend 
with local communities is uncertain, risking long term care and perhaps leading to an emphasis on 
short term treatment rather than capacity building. Moreover a conflict can be fluid with the result 
that forces move around. If an area is secured and forces move on, what residual health care 
remains? If an area is abandoned to the enemy, might those treated by US forces be seen as 
collaborators rather than innocents who happened to be in need of medical care? And might 
enemy forces also provide medical care, perhaps better attuned to local needs because of 
language or cultural factors, turning healthcare into an area of competition where the US, despite 
its scientific prowess, is at a disadvantage simply because it might not understand the local 
population? Finally, the nature of the military mission may change altering both medical capacity 
and relations with local communities. In Iraq, the US moved from the status of an occupying power 
to support for the new government, while in Somalia a mission to assist the delivery of 
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humanitarian aid quickly escalated into something much more dangerous. These changes affect 
relations with local communities and the ability to deliver ad hoc medical care.  
 
Overall therefore, tailgate medicine appears to present as many risks – on both strategic and 
humanitarian grounds – as it does advantages. Amongst its advantages are some short term 
medical benefit, especially for acute conditions, and from this an improvement in public opinion 
at the local level. This may have tactical benefits and in some instances strategic effect. One 
example of the latter might be when tailgate medicine addresses an issue which receives 
considerable media attention. (The corollary of this is that the failure to use spare medical 
capacity may attract high profile media criticism undermining the public relations effort.) 
However the ad hoc nature of such operations means that they are vulnerable to rapid changes. 
Indeed the potential for such operations to backfire and create resentment is clear. More 
importantly, if the political and military aim is national stability, then tailgate medicine appears to 
be a poor means of achieving this. Its focus is too local and short term and it is unable to address 





In contrast to tailgate medicine’s ad hoc nature and focus on short term primary care, medical 
diplomacy can be more long term and focussed as much on infrastructure requirements, including 
training of medical personnel, as on immediate treatment needs.15 It is therefore much more 
broadly conceived than tailgate medicine, exploiting a key US soft power advantage. Nor is it 
solely limited to conflict situations. A number of commentators have identified the use of ‘health 
diplomacy’ by other states (especially Cuba and China) to develop goodwill, which has in turn 
encouraged the US to engage in similar acts.16 Indeed former Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Cascells has admitted as much, drawing particular attention to the success of China in “winning 
hearts and minds by providing healthcare, roads and education” through its aid activities and 
suggesting that the US needs to compete in this area.17  
 
Precisely how medical diplomacy differs from development assistance in the health sector (which 
may similarly increase goodwill) is unclear. The difference might be simply an institutional one – is 
the DoD/MoD or USAID/DfID leading the way? Alternatively it might be tentatively suggested that 
the key difference is in whether the political aims or the health outcomes are prioritised. However, 
this may oversimplify an often complex mix of motives and assumes that motives are shared across 
a government.18  What medical diplomacy does tap into however is a strong sense that this is a 
comparative advantage which could be used to influence target populations and build goodwill. The 
foreign and security policy community in the US in particular clearly believes that hearts and minds 
can be won through health investments.  Indeed a case can be made that health investments are 
not simply an attempt by the US to exploit an area of comparative advantage for political purposes, 
but are an area of competition within a conflict.19 
 
Of course reconstruction and development is a difficult task, and even well-managed and targeted 
reconstruction efforts would deliver limited political benefits in the short term. Thus tailgate 
medicine still holds some attraction, not least for its immediacy and its short term tangible benefits. 
This can be crucial in a media intrusive environment where failure to treat may be a PR disaster, but 
may also appeal to the ‘can-do’ action-oriented attitudes of the military. Nevertheless as one US 
military officer recently commented: 
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I used to believe in MEDCAPs, but I saw that we achieved greater, more long-
lasting, enduring effects when we focused on improving their medical 
system.20  
 
Bringing communities together: Health as a Bridge for Peace 
 
In addition to medical diplomacy and tailgate medicine, a further type of intervention falling under 
the broad definition of health diplomacy are attempts to leverage the health sector as a tool of 
peacemaking and peacebuilding. In contrast to medical diplomacy and ‘tailgate medicine’, the 
origins of HBP are to be found chiefly in the health and development fields. Again, it is important to 
recognise the broader intellectual context within which HBP developed.  Although, its origins can be 
traced back to the 1980s, HBP has been to a great extent a post-Cold War phenomenon, with the 
aftermath of the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s being a key testing ground. As such, HBP has 
developed alongside a general increase in attention on the role of the international community in 
post-conflict peacebuilding. Following Boutros-Ghali’s seminal 1992 statement An Agenda for Peace 
the challenge was laid down for all parts of the UN System to examine what contribution they could 
make to creating the conditions for peace and stability in conflict and post-conflict settings. The 
WHO was not exempt from this and began seriously considering the ways in which its work could 
play a part. In doing so WHO looked to the past for inspiration, in particular PAHO’s activities in 
Central America in the mid-1980s. It was from here that the ‘Health as a Bridge for Peace’ 
terminology was drawn, and from here that some of the lessons which informed the later, 
somewhat broader, attempts to leverage the health sector for peacebuilding were learned. 
 
The concept of Health as a Bridge for Peace has often been expressed at the idea that health can be 
a ‘superordinate goal’21, a relatively non-contentious issue which can transcend division between 
communities and promote dialogue and cooperation.  AS WHO puts it, “Health can be a neutral 
meeting point to bring conflicting parties together to discuss mutually beneficial interventions.”22 
Here we reject the idea that such interventions are apolitical. Indeed they are inherently political: 
their entire purpose is to leverage health interventions in order to achieve a political effect (in this 
case to promote peace). Proponents of HBP seek to address this potential tension firstly through the 
argument that peace is a prerequisite to health (and therefore that peace is the business of all 
health-sector actors), and secondly through the claim is that it is possible to achieve both health and 
peace outcomes without sacrificing one for the other. It is because HBP operations represent a 
coming-together of health interventions and political goals that they should be seen as a part of 
health diplomacy, and it is also for this reason that they have attracted concerns over their potential 
for taking WHO beyond its technical mandate and politicizing its role.23 
 
During the 1980s PAHO pioneered the negotiation of temporary humanitarian ceasefires to allow 
vaccination programmes. The conflicts in El Salvador and Peru in particular were widely identified as 
major obstacles to the successful eradication of polio, and PAHO and its collaborating organizations 
set about a process of convincing those governments and their opposition guerrilla insurgencies of 
the need to agree temporary ceasefires to allow the vaccination programme to be fully implemented 
on a nationwide basis. These initiatives ran parallel to the regional peace process (the Contadora 
initiative).In terms of health effects, this proved extremely effective. But the bigger claim is that they 
made a contribution to peacemaking by establishing constructive dialogue. Most obviously, both 
sides were persuaded to temporarily lay down their arms in order for the vaccination process to be 
carried out. The significance of this should not be underestimated: it was a real achievement by 
health advocates working in the context of a lengthy and frequently brutal civil war, and it stands in 
stark contrast to more recent cases elsewhere in which polio eradication efforts have been 
hampered by the deliberate targeting of vaccinators by  militant groups.24 Yet these days of 
tranquillity were by their very nature temporary. Once they were over the fighting resumed. Actually 
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demonstrating a causal link between these initiatives and the comprehensive peace process which 
culminated in the signing of the Chapultepec Accords in February 1992 is exceedingly difficult. 
Despite this, there is a widespread and oft-repeated perception that the days of tranquillity did 
make a meaningful contribution to peace.25 However, the ‘causes of peace’ in El Salvador were many 
and varied and the PAHO immunization programme does not appear in the literature on the 
Salvadoran peace process at all. Neither is it clear that the temporary ceasefires significantly raised 
the level of trust between the FMLN and the government. We cannot entirely exclude the possibility 
that the immunization campaign had some political effects in helping to bring the parties together, 
but the evidence suggests that its significance was limited. Furthermore, there is an alternative 
interpretation of the immunization campaigns which presents them not some much as a ‘bridge to 
peace’ but rather as a part of a wartime PR campaign intended to garner goodwill for the 
government.  
 
Despite the difficulties associated with evidencing the effectiveness of the days of tranquillity the 
core ideas did not die. Similar initiatives were implemented in numerous subsequent cases including 
Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Chechnya/Russia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, 
Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mozambique, Philippines, Dominican Republic, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri 
Lanka, Tajikistan, and Uganda.26 In particular the 1990s saw attempts by WHO and its partners to 
apply the basic logic underlying the ‘days of tranquillity’ far more widely. In so doing the ‘Health as a 
Bridge for Peace’ label was stretched to apply to a number of different engagements in conflict and 
post-conflict situations. In the mid-1990s HBP began to emerge within the WHO as an explicit part of 
its approach to the provision of health assistance in complex humanitarian emergencies. The WHO’s 
expanded definition of the concept described it as 
 
a multidimensional policy and planning framework which supports health workers in 
delivering health programmes in conflict and post-conflict situations and at the same 
time contributes to peace-building. It is defined as the integration of peace-building 
concerns, concepts, principles, strategies and practices into health relief and health 
sector development. 
The Health as a Bridge for Peace concept is rooted in values derived from human 
rights and humanitarian principles as well as medical ethics. It is supported by the 
conviction that it is imperative to adopt peace-building strategies to ensure lasting 
health gains in the context of social instability and complex emergencies. 
In achieving the primary goal of health for societies prone to and affected by war, 
we as health professionals recognize responsibilities to create opportunities for 
peace.27 
The idea of integration is key: that peace-building aims can be built into humanitarian assistance and 
development activities without undermining their effectiveness as health measures. It was noted 
above that both medical diplomacy and tailgate medicine can end up prioritising the political aims 
over health outcomes (although, of course, they seek to make a contribution to both). Humanitarian 
ceasefires, perhaps, fall more on the opposite weighting of these two priorities, the delivery of 
medical services being the essential task whilst political effects are hoped for but rarely 
demonstrable in practice. The WHO definition of HBP, however, effectively rejects this dichotomy, 
by arguing that peace is a prerequisite for achieving lasting health gains. The two are, therefore, 
indivisible. According to the WHO definition health professionals not only have the opportunity to 
make a contribution to peacebuilding, but “responsibilities to create opportunities for peace.” This 
is, of course, a difficult thing to achieve in practice, and one which lies beyond the traditional skill-set 
of most health professionals.28 
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One of the clearest examples of such a programme, and the one we focus on here, was the ‘Peace 
through Health’ programme implemented by WHO and the UK’s Department for International 
Development in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in 1997-8. The Dayton Peace Agreement presented 
particular challenges to organizations like the WHO charged with the reconstruction of the country. 
The problems was not simply a damaged health infrastructure, but a health system ethnically 
divided as a result of the Dayton agreement into two. In fact, given the divisions between Bosniaks 
and Bosnian Croats within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there were effectively three 
systems. 29 The key elements of the HBP programme were therefore focussed upon reducing 
discrimination, polarization, centralization of power and violence. The attempt to use the health 
sector to promote reconciliation was the focus of many of the activities carried out under the 
programme.30  
 
Once again, the question of effectiveness as a peacebuilding measure raises its head. And once again 
this is a difficult question to answer. Nevertheless, it was argued that WHO’s efforts had indeed 
contributed to reducing polarization in the health sector; establishing a legal framework to combat 
discrimination; promoting dialogue and confidence building; and fostering cross-community 
activities amongst other things.31 Whilst these remain difficult to measure, the carrying out of a 
critical and reflective evaluation of the project lends more credibility to the claim that a contribution 
to peace was achieved.  
 
 
Dangers and Dilemmas 
 
Although they are in some ways quite different enterprises with markedly different institutional 
origins, there are a number of fundamental similarities between HBP-type engagements and health 
interventions in conflicts. Both are essentially seeking to leverage health for political ends. Both rest 
upon an assumption that the provision of public goods such as health and medical services can 
change attitudes in desirable ways. The modalities are somewhat different, as are the ways in which 
the balance between health goals and political goals is struck. Each, however, is an example of the 
new health diplomacy. 
 
However, there are a number of common dangers and dilemmas which confront all of these 
attempts to leverage health for political ends in different ways and to different extents. Here we 





The timeframe in which health and political ends are meant to be achieved leads to very different 
ideas about what should be done and how. It is extremely difficult to secure gains across all 
timeframes simultaneously, and doing so requires more than one type of approach. Furthermore, as 
we have shown here, there can be tensions between them. The ultra-short term nature of ‘days of 
tranquillity’ could in some cases prolong conflict rather than bring peace. Tailgate medicine brings 
the danger of usurping the local health infrastructure and undermining the long-term credibility of 
the host state. Longer-term HBP and medical diplomacy efforts may do little to reduce tensions in 
the short term, and could even increase them if there is a perception of political bias. 
 
 
2. Demonstrating effectiveness 
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All of these activities are intended to produce outcomes which are inherently difficult to measure. 
Questions such as whether hearts and minds have been won, of whether peace has been secured, 
and  whether reputations have been improved do not lend themselves to easy answers. Proponents 
of all of the activities which we have discussed here routinely point to anecdotal evidence of their 
successes. Detailed evaluations are the exception rather than the rule. 
 
Causal mechanisms are rarely explained and intervening variables rarely identified. Rather, there is a 
tendency to assume linkages between certain activities and certain outcomes. Bringing people 
together, for example, is often presented as leading inexorably to greater understanding between 
communities. This is one possible outcome, but it is not the only one.  
 
 
3. What to do about the host state? 
 
Despite the rhetoric about the importance of strengthening national governments, the primarily 
externally-led interventions considered here bring a danger of actually undermining the 
government. The temptation in post-conflict situations is for a greater degree of international 
intervention in domestic health policy making.32 But such an approach neither builds local capacity 
nor does it increase the population’s confidence in their own government. Indeed it may serve to 
foster long-term dependency and undermine the state’s credibility. Such problems are even more 
real, of course, when the political aim is not to build confidence in the host government at all, but 
rather to improve attitudes towards an intervening force. 
 
 
4. Self-defeating actions elsewhere 
 
Both medical diplomacy and HBP operations tend to be comparatively minor moves in much bigger 
political games. Clear examples of this can be seen in all of the activities which we have examined 
here. Tailgate medicine has been used in Iraq and Afghanistan in an attempt to win over the local 
populations at the same time as other actions (the mistaken aerial bombardment of a wedding 
celebration in Afghanistan, the abuses of prisoners at Abu Ghraib) undermine that very same 
message. The HBP initiative in BiH was carried out in the context of the Dayton Accords which set 
the agenda for the health system (not the other way around). Thus the attempts to bring 
communities together and promote reconciliation through the health sector was taking place after 
the administrative apparatus of health has been formally separated along ethnic grounds.  
 
 
5. Which takes priority – political aims or health outcomes? 
 
There are inherent tensions between health objectives and political aims. The boundary between 
‘pure’ humanitarianism and aid for a political objective is a fuzzy and uncertain one, and the 
approaches we have examined here have all attempted to strike this balance in different ways.  
Privileging one or the other can lead to failures of different sorts, and attempting to achieve both 
can lead to achieving neither.  
 
 
Politicization , impartiality and neutrality 
 
Finally, probably the most common criticism of all of these types of activities is the danger of 
politicizing those health professionals (both local and international) who are responsible for 
delivering health services.  
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Although the aims of the different types of intervention we have discussed here are markedly 
different, both are seeking to leverage health for political ends. In doing so they challenge the 
traditional idea that health interventions can (or should) be separated from politics. This idea has 
historically been seen as fundamental to the operation of humanitarian and health agencies working 
in conflict situations. The ICRC, for example, sees its status as an “impartial, neutral and independent 
organization” which has an “exclusively humanitarian mission” as fundamental to its ability to 
deliver humanitarian assistance.33 WHO has also traded on its status as a politically-neutral health –
focussed actor in order to gain access for aid delivery in conflict situations. The idea of involvement 
in the delivery of foreign and security policy objectives is a direct challenge to such a view and has 
frequently been strongly resisted by some international NGOs and others.34  
 
In the HBP case the ‘politically-driven’ nature of the operations is not always made explicit. Indeed 
there is a tension at the very heart of the concept: on the one hand the claim is being made that 
health is a politically-neutral arena in which trust can be built; on the other it is being claimed that 
there can be political outcomes (the promotion of peace and reconciliation) from certain types of 
interventions. But as noted above, it is not inevitable that health will turn out to be universally seen 
as a common good around which trust can be built. In fact the opposite is possible – health (and in 
particular access to health services) can become a bone of contention around which further distrust, 
discrimination and injustice can coalesce. There were concerns raised during the WHO’s consultation 
that HBP could lead to a politicization of its role, hindering its ability to work effectively in conflict 
settings. Whilst military medics delivering tailgate medicine are generally less vulnerable to having 
their ability to deliver services threatened by perceived politicization  - after all, by virtue of the 
uniform they wear they are much more obviously associated with one side in a conflict - there have 
been concerns raised that their activities can negatively impact upon other agencies by encouraging 
the idea that health assistance is politically-driven.  
 
Describing the problem as one of the entry of politics into humanitarian assistance may, however, be 
the wrong line of attack. All health interventions are inherently political because they always involve 
choices about where, how and when to intervene and for whom. Paul O’Brien, advocacy coordinator 
for CARE in Afghanistan, argued that 
 
(1) Humanitarianism is and should be political, (2) humanitarians can and should 
speak out about the justice and injustice of war, and (3) accepting funding from 
belligerents in war can make both principled and pragmatic good sense.35 
  
It is certainly the case that there are extremely serious issues at stake in this debate. In a number of 
recent conflicts charitable medical organisations have been targeted by belligerents. Even the ICRC – 
“the most apolitical of humanitarian agencies”36 - found itself targeted by suicide bombers who 
drove an ambulance packed with explosives into its Baghdad headquarters in 2003, killing 12 
people.37 Despite their proclaimed neutrality, because their humanitarian actions benefit one side to 
the cost of the other, charitable organisations may be seen by some as part of the struggle.  
 
Part of the problem in this ongoing debate has been one of terminology. Terms such as ‘apolitical’, 
‘neutral’ and ‘impartial’ have often been used interchangeably or in inconsistent ways. Even if we 
accept that health interventions can never be entirely apolitical, the distinctions between neutrality 
and impartiality still causes problems. Dominick Donald distinguishes between impartiality and 
neutrality thus: 
 
An impartial entity is active, its actions independent of the parties to a conflict, based on a 
judgement of the situation; it is fair and just in its treatment of the parties while not taking 
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sides. A neutral is much more passive; its limited actions are within restrictions imposed by 
the belligerents, whilst its abstention from the conflict is based on an ‘absence of decided 
views’. 38 
 
According to  these definitions impartiality may well be desirable for those working in conflict 
situations, but neutrality - often interpreted as a passive stance precluding the passing of 
judgements on the behaviour of the parties to a conflict - may not. 39 Kenneth Anderson has 
criticised the ‘moral poverty of neutrality’ arguing that “It is not possible for everyone to stand aside 
as neutrals, even for the worthy purpose of treating evil’s victims humanely, lest evil be allowed to 
triumph.”40 It is not desirable to have limits on humanitarian aid imposed by the warring parties, nor 
for agencies working on the ground to be prohibited from criticising the actions of one side or the 
other (for example, in relation to human rights abuses). It is for this reason that many humanitarian 
agencies have in recent years moved away from neutrality as the underpinning principle of their 
humanitarian character. But arguably this stance has now come under attack as humanitarian aid 
agencies find themselves becoming targets.  
 
Too often, we argue, there is a failure to distinguish between being non-political (which we argue is 
never possible in the case of health interventions), being neutral (which brings the problems 
associated with passivity), and being impartial. It is the latter, that health sector actors must strive to 
achieve in conflict and post-conflict situations. They should avoid favouring one side or the other as 
far as possible, but remain politically/morally driven. HBP actors should remain impartial between 
the parties, but partial to the goal of building peace. In reality, of course, even humanitarian 
agencies who attempt to remain scrupulously impartial are regularly subject to accusations of 
favouring one side or another in a conflict situation.  This is perhaps inevitable, and one of the 
difficulties inherent in providing health assistance in conflict situations. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Tommy G. Thompson, ‘The Cure for Tyranny’, The Boston Globe, 24 October 2005. Available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2005/10/24/the_cure_for_tyranny/  
2
 This approach was not limited to the Cold War, but was seen in post-Cold War crises such as Somalia and Iraq 
where the problem was seen as the leadership of a state, not its people. Removal of leaders such as Milosevic, 
Aideed and Saddam Hussein would allow the development of democracy and peaceful relations. 
Unfortunately, as events in Somalia and then Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated, this does not always 
follow. 
3
 Harley Feldbaum & Joshua Miachaud, ‘Health Diplomacy: Navigating Between Global Health and Foreign 
Policy’. 
4
 See for example Elspeth Cameron Ritchie and Robert L. Mott, ‘Military humanitarian assistance: the pitfalls 
and promise of good intentions’, in Military Medical Ethics vol.2, p.824. 
5
 Baker,  p.68. See also Robert J. Wilensky, Military Medicine to Win Hearts and Minds (Lubbock: Texas Tech 
University Press, 2004). 
6
 Ilona Kickbusch, ‘Influence And Opportunity: Reflections On The U.S. Role In Global Public Health’,  Health 
Affairs  vol. 21, number 6 (2002), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/21/6/131. 
7
 MS Baker and P Ryals, ‘The Medical Department in military operations other than war. Part II: Medical civic 
assistance program in Southeast Asia’, Military Medicine  164/9 (1999), pp.619-25. 
8
 See Ritchie and Mott, pp.819-20. 
9
 Stewart Patrick & Kaysie Brown, ‘The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD’s 
Expanding Role’, Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 131, November 2007.  
10
 S. Ward Casscells, ‘DoD’s increasing role in global public health’, CSIS, January 7 2009. Powerpoint slides 
available at: http://www.csis.org/media/csis/events/090107_casscells.pdf. Audio available at 




 See also Ritchie and Mott p.810; and ’Voices from the front’. 
 11 
                                                                                                                                                        
13
 Tailgate medicine is also used in peacetime operations where the purpose may be training. See Ritchie and 
Mott p.810. 
14
 Malish, Scott and Rasheed,  pp137-9; Baker op. cit.; Ritchie and Mott op.cit., p.813; 
15
 Tommy G. Thompson, p.1 
16
 For example, Information Dissemination: Observations of an Armchair Admiral,  ‘Medical diplomacy 
developing buzz’, 5 February 2008, available at 
http://informationdissemination.blogspot.com/2008/02/medical-diplomacy-developing-buzz.html, last 
accessed 2 March 2009; Chris Kraul, ‘Catching up on medical diplomacy’, Los Angeles Times  9 April 2007 p.A-5; 
McAvoy op.cit. For a discussion of China’s health diplomacy in Africa see Drew Thompson, ‘China’s soft power 
in Africa: from ‘Beijing consensus’ to Health Diplomacy’, China Brief 5/21 (October 2005), pp.1-3. 
17
 S. Ward Casscells, ‘DoD’s increasing role in global public health’ 
18
 For example the US programme for AIDS relief, PEPFAR, has both a humanitarian and development 
dimension, but was also used to ‘soften’ the image of the US at the time of the invasion of Iraq. 
19
 Donald F. Thompson, p.3 
20
 Lieutenant Colonel Chris Hickey, quoted in Baker,  p.72. 
21
 e.g. Graeme MacQueen and Joanna Santa Barbara, ‘Mechanisms of Peace through Health’ in Neil Arya & 
Joanna Santa Barbara (eds.), Peace through Health: How health professionals can work for a less violent world 
(Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, 2008), pp.30-32. 
22
 WHO, ‘Why Health as a Bridge for Peace?’. Available from 
http://www.who.int/hac/techguidance/hbp/about_why/en/index.html  
23
 Yves Beigbeder, ‘The World Health Organization and peacekeeping’, International Peacekeeping vol.5(4) 
(1998), p.47. 
24
 e.g. IRIN, ‘Pakistan: Militants hampering anti-polio drive as new case confirmed’ (17 July 2008), available 
from http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=79297; IRIN, ‘Afghanistan: Taliban blocks polio 
vaccination’ (15 March 2007), available from http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=70721.  
25
 Neil Arya, ‘Secondary Prevention: Humanitarian ceasefires”, p.193; Ciro A. de Quatros & Daniel Epstein, 
‘Health as a bridge for peace: PAHO’s experience’, The Lancet Vol.360, Supplement 1, December 2002, pp. s25-
s26; Conference on Health for Peace held in Madrid’, PAHO Bulletin vol.22(3) (1988), pp.326-330. 
26
 ‘Health as a potential contribution to peace. Realities from the field: What has WHO learned in the 1990s’. 
Available at http://www.who.int/hac/techguidance/hbp/en/health-poster.pdf  
27
 WHO, ‘What is Health as a Bridge for Peace?’. Available at 
http://www.who.int/hac/techguidance/hbp/about/en/index.html   
28
 This fact was recognised by the WHO, and there is a significant emphasis in the HBP consultation documents 
on the training requirements for successful HBP operations.  
29
 World Health Organization Europe, WHO/DFID Peace Through Health Programme: A case study prepared by 
the WHO field team in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Copenhagen: WHO Europe, 1998), p.9. 
30
 World Health Organization Europe, p.18. 
31
 WHO Europe, WHO/DFID Peace Through Health Programme, pp.33-39. 
32
 S.A. Okuonzi and J. Macrae, ‘Whose policy is it anyway? International and national influences on health 
policy development in Uganda’, Health Policy and Planning, 10(2), June 1995, pp.122-132. 
33




 e.g. Nellie Bristol, ‘Military incursions into aid work anger humanitarian groups’, The Lancet 367/9508, 
pp.384-6; Priya Shetty, ‘How important is neutrality to humanitarian aid agencies?’, The Lancet 370/9585, 
pp.377-8. 
35
 Paul O’Brien, ‘Politicized Humanitarianism: A Reply to Nicolas de Torrente’, Harvard Human Rights Journal 
vol.17 (2004), p.31. 
36
 O’Brien p.35 
37
 The Guardian, ‘Up to 40 die in Baghdad attacks’. 27 October 2003. Available from 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/oct/27/iraq.  
38
 Dominick Donald, ‘Neutrality, Impartiality and UN Peacekeeping at the Beginning of the 21
st
 Century’, 
International Peacekeeping 9/4 (Winter 2002), pp.22. Marrack Goulding makes a similar distinction: Marrack 
Goulding, Peacemonger (London: John Murray, 2002), p.222. 
39
 Hugo Slim, ‘Relief agencies and moral standing in war: principle of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and 
solidarity’, Development in Practice 4/7 (November 1997), pp.342-352. 
 12 
                                                                                                                                                        
40
 Kenneth Anderson, ‘Humanitarian Inviolability in Crisis: The Meaning of Impartiality and Neutrality for UN 
and NGO Agencies following the 2003-2004 Afghanistan and Iraq Conflicts’, Harvard Human Rights Journal 
vol.17 (Spring 2004), pp.41-74. 
